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Roslyn Weiss declares that her aims in this book are modest, but in fact her accomplishments are 
tremendous.  Weiss’s goal is to demonstrate that in the Republic Plato presents us with not just one 
rendering of the philosopher (1). Even though readers expect all the Republic’s philosophers to be 
the same, Weiss successfully demonstrates that the Republic covers at least four types of 
philosophers (five, she says, if we count the type of philosopher Socrates is). The first type is the 
natural philosopher who ultimately stays true to philosophy; the second is the natural philosopher 
who gets corrupted and consequently fails to be a philosopher; the third is the imitation philosopher 
whose inferior nature interrupts the desire to be a philosopher; the fourth is the imitation philosopher 
who is designed to philosophize. Weiss’s book focuses on the two types who persist with philosophy:  
the natural philosopher (first type) and the philosopher by design (fourth type). 
 
Weiss’s thesis contends that the first portrait emerges in Republic 5 and continues through 
Book 6 502c-e. She writes: ‘The paradigm of the philosopher advanced in Book 5 is thus intended 
to be definitive and to set the philosopher decisively apart from those who resemble him merely 
superficially’ (14). In Book 5 Plato has Socrates describe this natural lover of learning who is eager 
to promote in cities and souls goodness that is inspired by the Form of the Good. These philosophers 
engage readily in civic leadership. Weiss calls them ‘natural philosophers’. From 502e through Book 
7’s allegory of the cave a different sort of philosopher appears who is trained to love the Forms. 
Weiss calls them ‘philosophers by design’. Philosophers by design lack an inherent love of truth and 
justice as well as an intrinsic motivation to be leaders. 
 
The crucial distinctions Weiss observes between the natural philosophers and the 
philosophers by design provide relief from the serious difficulties stemming from the standard 
assumption that all the Republic’s philosophers are the same. Scholars have spilled much ink over 
the unanticipated need to compel philosophers to rule in Book 7. Weiss detects a simple but elegant 
solution to this problem. On her reading, the natural philosophers are good and decent, willing and 
able to be useful to cities and souls, where the philosophers by design are the ones who are too cold 
or too occupied intellectually to benefit others. Weiss’s analysis of these two competing 
philosophical paradigms is the brilliant sort that leaves even careful readers wondering how we failed 
to see for ourselves what she has now carefully demonstrated. 
 
Some readers may have reservations about the certainty with which Weiss finds a break in 
the Republic between the paradigm of the natural philosopher and that of the philosopher by design. 
I agree that the portrayal of the natural philosopher is definitively concluded at 502c-d. Plato has 
Socrates announce: ‘Then we can now conclude that this legislation is best, if only it is possible, and 
that, while it is hard for it to come about, it is not impossible’ (502c). Weiss herself notes that, even 
though Socrates clearly considers the issues surrounding the natural philosophical paradigm 
‘disposed of’ (502c), the shift would be more evident if Book 7 began straightaway after 502c (8, n. 
20). But the metaphysical investigations at the end of Book 6 serve as an interlude between Plato’s 
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The main two disagreements I have with Weiss are as follows. 
 
First, I am inclined to disagree with Weiss about how to classify Socrates using the 
framework of four philosophical types. She finds it impossible to classify Socrates with the natural  
philosophers of Book 6 (9-10, 132) because his piety makes him actively fight for justice and try to 
improve human souls, while the natural philosophers never get corrupted but never get to be useful 
as leaders either because ‘they’ve seen the madness of the majority and realized, in a word, that 
hardly anyone acts sanely in public affairs and that there is no ally with whom they might go to the 
aid of justice and survive’ (496c). The passage where natural philosophers are said to ‘lead a quiet 
life and do their own work’ like taking ‘refuge under a little wall from a storm’ is one where Plato 
has Socrates imply he is one of these philosophers who never gets to be useful in leading the 
community, which suggests he should be classified as a natural philosopher. However, even though 
Socrates’ daemonic sign keeps him out of conventional politics, he does not lead a quiet, apolitical 
life. As a result, Weiss suggests Socrates is a fifth type of philosopher who exists implicitly in the 
Republic. I wonder why Weiss does not consider Socrates a natural philosopher who is just less 
scared off from the active life than the other natural philosophers who lack allies with whom to fight 
for justice. For me, it is as though we now have a bifurcation of the first type—the natural 
philosophers who never get corrupted, who always want to promote goodness—with one sub-set 
who sits out of civic leadership because of living in exile among those who will not fight for justice 
(like the philosophers at 496b-d) and another sub-set who also lives exiled among those who will not 
assist in the fight for justice but who cannot resist the desire to try to improve cities and souls even 
if that will jeopardize one’s survival (like Socrates). 
 
Second, I find myself at odds with Weiss’s contention that where appetitive ties are not 
severed, then one’s nature is appetitive and thus not philosophical (69; see also 78 n. 61). At Republic 
485d Socrates uses a hydraulic metaphor, claiming that ‘when someone’s desires incline strongly for 
one thing, they are thereby weakened for others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into 
another channel’. The logic of the hydraulic model leads to the conclusion that true philosophers will 
be concerned with the pleasures of the soul ‘itself by itself’ and merely counterfeit philosophers will 
continue with the pleasures of the body. This passage flies in the face not only of the example of 
Socrates but also of an important aspect of the Republic, namely, the theme of rare impossible 
natures. There are multiple instances where Plato emphasizes the significance of distinct and even 
opposing traits being combined in one person’s nature. In Book 2, the best guardian is peculiarly 
both gentle with his own and savagely fierce to the enemy (375c), and in Book 6, philosophers 
manage to be quick-witted while also stable (503b-d). Weiss herself sees 485a as another instance of 
distinct qualities coming together in one soul (18). There the philosopher possesses both superior 
intellectual qualities and superior moral qualities. Why should all these distinct or opposing qualities 
be combinable when it is impossible to desire the pleasures of both the body and soul? In my view 
the hydraulic model speaks to the philosopher’s indifference toward the pleasures of the body rather 
than abandonment of the pleasures of the body. Plato’s Socrates exemplifies the philosophical nature, 
which is indifferent to physical pleasures while still experiencing them, but a fuller treatment of this 
issue must be offered elsewhere. 
 
 While I cannot attend to all the interesting aspects of Weiss’s project here, one of its other 
valuable features is the first-rate treatment of Glaucon and Adeimantus. Weiss’s interpretation of the 
brothers (especially Glaucon) and their perspective helps readers understand why, as they engage  
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Socrates on the question of the worth of justice, Socrates engages them on the philosopher’s value  
in political life. She reminds us that Glaucon is more genteel than the coarse hedonist he is often 
made out to be (4). Weiss explains that while Glaucon is no philosopher, he is an important driver of 
the conversation in the Republic, and Glaucon is proud to participate in Socrates’ effort to purify 
Glaucon’s second city, the so-called ‘feverish’ city, into the Kallipolis (5). The rival cities, rulers, 
and philosophers of the Republic are presented by and for Glaucon. For instance, Weiss calls our 
attention to the way in which the nuanced paradigm of the natural philosopher is developed in 
response to Glaucon’s clouded, negative picture of the philosopher Socrates thinks should 
rule. Furthermore, Weiss emphasizes that the second philosophical paradigm is created precisely 
because that modified philosopher ‘is one Glaucon can respect. By supplementing intellectual 
qualities with those of the typical soldier, Socrates keeps Glaucon from dismissing the value of 
philosophy and encourages him to admire the smart and manly philosopher-warrior’ (50). And most 
importantly, Weiss draws our attention to Glaucon’s failure to see the shortcomings of the second 
philosophical paradigm (128). 
 
 I commend Roslyn Weiss for writing an exciting, original book that revolutionizes scholarly 
interpretation of the Republic. Uncovering Plato’s distinction between two radically different and 
irreconcilable philosophical paradigms is one of Weiss’s finest achievements. 
 
 
Coleen Zoller, Susquehanna University 
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